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Biases in judgments and decision making that are commonly
explained in terms of the judge's prior expectancies can originate
in unbiased environmental learning. Applying a recently devel-
oped sampling approach to decision making to the assessment of
student achievement in a simulated classroom, we investigate
systematic biases in teacher's judgment of student achievement.
What might appear to reflect teacher expectancies based on
students' overall ability level, gender stereotypes, or naõÈve
behavioral theories can be explained by ordinary learning rules
underlying decision making, such as increasing accuracy with
increasing sample size of observations in a probabilistic environ-
ment. Ability (% correct answers) and motivation levels (% raising
hands) of 16 students in eight subject matters were manipulated.
In Experiment 1 the judged difference between smart and poor
students increased with sample size, due to participation rate or
unequal teacher attention. In Experiment 2, verification biases
in hypothesis testing about the relative assets of boys and girls
in language and science were shown to be independent of gender
stereotypes, but mediated instead by differential size of stimulus
samples. Experiment 3 showed that judges' sensitivity to environ-
mental base rates can mimic expectancy biases resulting from
scripted knowledge. q 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
Imagine a female student who shows little motivation in math, and who is
known to be rather poor at other disciplines. How might the teacher's judgment
processes affect the evaluation of this particular student's performance in
The research underlying the present article was supported by grants from the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft. Helpful comments on earlier versions of this article by two anonymous
reviewers are gratefully acknowledged.
Address correspondence and reprint requests to Klaus Fiedler, Department of Psychology,




q 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
All rights reserved.
528 FIEDLER ET AL.
maths? Would teachers tend to overestimate or underestimate her performance,
relative to her objective rate of correct responses? By all intuition, any bias
should be to her disadvantage. Inferences from other subject matters ought to
be negative, low motivation suggests lack of interest, and common gender
stereotypes hardly consider maths a female domain. Nevertheless, we will
show that judgement tendencies may actually favor such a student.
The aim of the present research was to open new perspectives on prominent
issues of judgment and decision under uncertainty. Our focus is on judgment
tendencies that have been traditionally interpreted as reflecting systematically
biased cognitive processes, using teachers' assessment of student achievement
as a sensible applied domain (cf. Jussim, 1989). Revisiting the issue of teacher
expectancy biases within a cognitive±ecological framework, we try to convey
the insight that biased judgments need not reflect biased processes. To be sure,
when teachers' subjective estimates deviate systematically from objectively
manipulated performance rates, it is appropriate to refer to a ªbiasº as distin-
guished from an unsystematic ªerror.º However, whereas the surplus meaning
of the term ªjudgment biasº entails the assumption that distorted cognitive or
motivated processes can be blamed, we highlight the notion that systematic
judgment tendencies can result from unbiased processes, as a normal by-prod-
uct of adaptive behavior in a probabilistic world. Even when no wishful think-
ing, prejudice, faulty expectation, or resource limitation is involved, judgment
biases will occur as an inevitable consequence of the stimulus environment to
which judges are exposed.
The dialectic notion of biases without biased processes is not as hard to
understand as it might first appear. To illustrate, hardly anybody would ques-
tion that judgments of the Self deviate systematically from judgments of other
people. Self-referent judgments are more differentiated (Sande, Goethals, &
Radloff, 1988), less polarized (Linville & Jones, 1980), and more sensitive to
contextual information (Watson, 1982) than other-referent judgments. Now,
would we predict that all self±other differences disappear when information
is processed rationally and in an unbiased fashion? Certainly not. Systematic
differences remain just because the samples of stimulus observations about
the Self and about others are highly unequal, skewed, and selective. Because
different individuals assess the same entities from different angles, relying on
different stimulus samples, their judgments can diverge in systematic, predict-
able ways. Note, however, that ªbiasesº within such an ecological framework
must not be equated with faulty, inefficient, or illogical cognitive processes.
Just as a ªbiasº in signal detection analysis (i.e., a flexible threshold shift, as
an adaptive function of the stimulus context), a bias in evaluative judgment
can reflect a sensitive ecological adaptation process.
Research Strategy
Investigating these issues in the institutionalized setting of teachers' achieve-
ment assessment in the classroom seems to be a useful strategy. Performance
assessment calls for natural judgments of probability (e.g., of correct responses)
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and can be compared to clearly defined performance criteria. Moreover, judg-
ments provide the basis for important and consequential decisions about the
students' academic career. Most previous research in this area has relied on
data from real school classes (cf. Jussim, Madon, & Chatman, 1994; Rosenthal &
Rubin, 1978). Such a research strategy, however, while maximizing realism,
may not be optimal for isolating different causal influences on teacher judg-
ments. In our attempt to gain more experimental control, we therefore employ
a different strategy, analyzing the acquisition of information about artificial
classes in a simulated mini-world. Participants are asked to play the role of a
teacher. Their task is to assess the performance of 16 students (eight girls
and eight boys) whose ability (proportion of correct responses) and motivation
(proportion of raising hand) in eight different subject matters is controlled
by the computer program. The simulated classroom setting is represented
graphically on the computer screen, showing 16 desks with the students' names
in different locations (Fig. 1). Teachers select questions from pull-down menus,
call upon one of the students who raises his/her hand, and so assess all 16
students' performance across several sessions. Photographs of students are
available in addition to their names to support the complex impression forma-
tion task. Resulting judgments of ability, motivation, and other aspects are
analyzed as a function of the students' true parametersÐand other theoreti-
cally relevant variables.
Such a simulation approach has several advantages. Prior knowledge can
be ruled out and the entire process of judgment formation can be studied from
the very first to the last observation, along with a computerized record of
every stimulus detail. The assignment of sitting positions and performance
FIG. 1. Screen-shot from the computer program used in all experiments.
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parameters to individual students can be counterbalanced, and the relations
between student gender, performance, and gender-typed subject matters (lan-
guage vs science) can be controlled. Yet, despite this high degree of experimental
control, the task setting is experienced as rich and seminaturalistic. Partic-
ipants report to form ªrealº personal relationships with ªtheirº students. Most
importantly, the interactive dynamics of a simulated classroom afford an oppor-
tunity to operationalize learning-based decision in a truly cognitive±ecological
framework. As several scholars have emphasized, in order to understand cogni-
tive processes within the individual, it is essential to describe the stimulus
environment impinging on the individual (Brunswik, 1955; Gibson, 1979; Gig-
erenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinboelting, 1991; Juslin & Montgomery, 1999;
McArthur & Baron, 1983).
Types of Expectancy Biases
The literature on achievement assessment is characterized by an ongoing
debate between the realist position emphasizing basic accuracy (e.g., Jussim,
1989, 1991) and the constructivist position that teacher expectations often
override real performance (e.g., Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Wineburg, 1987).
As we shall see, both positions can be reconciled within a cognitive±ecological
approach (cf. Jussim & Eccles, 1992); biases may arise in spite of basically
accurate processes.
Where judgments have been shown to deviate systematically from objective
performance measures, these biases are commonly attributed to preexisting
expectancies. Thus, in explaining the most prominent phenomenon of self-
fulfilling prophecies (Crano & Mellon, 1978; Jussim, Eccles, & Madon, 1996;
Kukla, 1993; Rosenthal, 1991; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Rosenthal & Rubin,
1978), it is assumed that the teacher's prior expectations solicit expected behav-
ior in the target person (student) that finally fulfills and justifies the initial
expectancy. Less popular is the notion of self-defeating prophecies (Kukla, 1993)
in which expectations solicit disconfirming or reactant behavior. Even when
the target's objective behavior remains unchanged, expectancies may distort
the judge's subjective perception of the target's behavior (Darley & Fazio, 1980;
Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Plessner, 1999;
Snyder, 1984). By default, theoretical explanations of teacher judgment biases
in academic settings refer to expectancies as a key theoretical construct (cf.
Jussim et al., 1994), just as in other domains of expert judgment (e.g., Ander-
son & Kellam, 1992; Dowling & Graham, 1976).
More specifically, three different types of influence of expectancies or prior
knowledge on decision making can be distinguished: (a) overgeneralization of
prior experience with decision targets; (b) naõÈve theories of decision target's
behavior or functioning; and (c) stereotypes associated with decision targets.
With students as targets, these expectancy types can be illustrated as follows.
Overgeneralization. Any preliminary classification of students as smart
versus poor, based on an early stage of learning, may be overgeneralized in
subsequent observations, as in the classical halo-effect (Cooper, 1981). Initial
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observations may create expectancies that bias subsequent assessment. Stu-
dents who are initially recognized as generally smart may then be treated
more positively and may be perceived and judged more favorably than students
initially classified as poor.
NaõÈve theories of student behavior. Teachers' inferences may be based on
heuristic cues. As ability is harder to observe than motivation, teachers may
infer ability from motivational cues (e.g., Brattesani, Weinstein, & Marshall,
1984). Given a class of 16 students of whom only one can answer each question,
there are 16 times more opportunities to observe motivation (who raises his/
her hand) than ability (answering a question). Thus, following a common naõÈve
theory, teachers may assume that students who often raise their hands a lot
know more than students who remain passive most of the time.
Social stereotypes. Last not least, expectancies may derive from stereotypi-
cal knowledge of the social categories to which individual students belong.
Gender stereotypes, in particular, afford a common source of achievement-
related expectations (e.g., Jussim, 1989), aside from socioeconomic class (Rosen-
thal & Jacobson, 1968). Gender-typing identifies maths and science as disci-
plines in which boys outperform girls, whereas girls are expected to mostly
exhibit their relative assets in arts and language. Due to these stereotypical
associations, the same performance in maths and science may appear more
intelligent and competent when exhibited by boys than girls, and the same
responses in arts or language may appear more favorable in girls than boys.
Similarly, teachers may selectively remember student performance that is con-
sistent with prevailing gender stereotypes.
Previous research has been quite creative in isolating various processes
through which prior expectancies can be confirmed in social interactionÐfrom
lop-sided information search (Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1977; Schulz-Hardt,
Frey, Moscovici, & LuÈ thgens, 2000; Snyder, 1984) and conversational rules
(Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, & Miyake, 1995) to the differential diagnosticity
of expected versus unexpected hypothesis tests (Trope & Thompson, 1997). In
all these paradigms, however, prior expectancies are considered the ultimate
source of judgment bias. Hardly any theoretical account has considered the
possibility that biased judgments may originate in unbiased stimulus learning,
quite independent of the judges' prior expectations.
A COGNITIVE±ECOLOGICAL SAMPLING APPROACH
We do not question the potential significance of genuine expectancy effects
originating in stereotypes, naõÈve theories, or overgeneralized distinctions. How-
ever, we point out an alternative and equally intriguing source of biases that
are basically stimulus-driven rather than expectancy-driven. This alternative
approach derives from a recently developed sampling approach to decision
making under uncertainty (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch, & Wild,
2000). The basic tenet of this approach is that judgments are often rather
accurate relative to the actually observed stimulus samples. However, exactly
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because judgments are so sensitive to inductive learning, any bias in the sample
of ecological data gathered from an individual's perspective will carry over to
subsequent judgments.
A comprehensive overview of the sampling approach and its psychological
implications is given elsewhere (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler et al., 2000). Suffice it
here to delineate the sampling framework as it applies to the present task
setting. We start from the Brunswikian assumption that student ability, just
like other distal entities, is not amenable to immediate perception. Ability
must be inferred or construed from whatever sampled data happen to be avail-
able. For convenience, ability might be conceived as a population parameter,
that is, the proportion of correct responses in the (unlimited) population of all
responses from that student. To ªperceiveº this latent attribute, an estimate
must be based on a limited sample of observations. Samples provide the inter-
face between the distal environment and cognitive judgment processes, whether
samples are gathered in the external world or in memory (Hastie & Park, 1986;
Juslin & Olsson, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
Let us distinguish the predictor and the criterion of a judgment problem,
analogous to an experimental design. Judging student ability means to consider
different students as a predictor, or independent variable, and ability as a
criterion, or dependent variable. Neither predictor information nor criterion
information is usually sampled randomly. On the predictor side, teachers gather
for various reasons more information about certain students than about others.
On the criterion side, too, high ability and low ability are not equally likely to
be observed. Predictor sampling as well as criterion sampling processes can
thereby lead to systematic biases. For instance, when latent ability is rather
low (e.g., at a level of 0.20 correct responses), sampling may obscure the low
population base rate because the students raise their hands only when they
know the correct answers, or actively evade the teacher's attention when they
do not know the correct answer. As a consequence of such a criterion sampling
effect, the effective stimulus sample may seriously overestimate the ªtrueº
latent ability. When exposed to such a biased sample of observations, teachers
should overestimate ability. Note that in this scenario, judgments inflate low
base rates not because they neglect base rates but, on the contrary, because
they are sensitive to actually observed base rates. In fact, the bias that results
from being exposed to an ecology that exhibits some data and conceals other
will increase with the accuracy of judgments, relative to the effective stimulus
input. Experimental evidence for rather strong biases of that kind comes from
recent studies on diagnostic decision making (Fiedler et al., 2000), showing
that the stimulus samples drawn from the universe were biased to a greater
extent, and actually justified even stronger biases, than those observed in the
resulting judgments. Thus, one of the distinct and theoretically challenging
implications of the sampling approach is that inflated probability judgments
of low base rate events may not reflect a base rate neglect (Borgida & Brekke,
1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) but the judges' sensitivity to unusual base
rates in the sample. Such an alternative account of the base rate fallacy even
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holds for judgments based on naturally observed event frequencies (cf. Giger-
enzer & Hoffrage, 1995).
Another intriguing implication is that variations in predictor sample size
alone can lead to systematic over- and underestimations, even when samples
are not biased toward specific criterion values. Thus, when there are clearly
unequal numbers of observations about different students, the superior mem-
ory strength and reliability of large as opposed to small samples is sufficient
to produce systematic effects. To illustrate this point, consider two students,
A and B, with exactly the same latent ability of say, 0.80 correct answers (in
the population of all possible answers). Assuming an unbiased teacher, both
correct and incorrect student answers have the same chance of being noticed,
encoded, and evaluated by the same fair criteria. However, a larger sample is
available on student A than B because B has been absent for some time. The
expected distribution of correct and incorrect answers (given 80% ability) could
thus be 121 (correct answers) and 32 (wrong answers) for A compared with
41 and 12 for B. Although both samples reflect the same distal ability parame-
ter, the 121, 32 sample is psychologically more ªsignificantº and more likely
to lead to favorable evaluations than the smaller 41, 12 sample. Teachers will
assess the actually existing ability level (i.e., the high rate of correct responses)
more reliably when the sample is large, giving rise to more accentuated, less
regressive judgments of student A than B (see Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999;
Fiedler, Kemmelmeier, & Freytag, 1999; Kaplan, 1981; Shavitt & Sanbon-
matsu, 1999).
Just as judges cannot be blamed for biased criterion samples (higher visibility
of certain outcomes), stronger inferences drawn from large (as opposed to small)
predictor samples need not reflect irrational processes or cognitive deficits.
Small samples are less reliable and less likely to reveal the properties that
show up clearly in large samples. In environmental learning, a fully normal,
adaptive rule is that behavioral responses increase with the amount of stimulus
information (i.e., the number of trials). Accordingly, even when the ability of
students A and B is equally high, 15 observations on A justifies stronger
inferences in a probabilistic world than only 5 observations on B. Normative
information-processing devices (such as the Bayes theorem or a t test) are
susceptible to this kind of environmentally generated bias.
Thus, variations in sample size alone can create a biased picture of the
distal world. As we move through the social environment, we encounter targets
representing high and low levels on various attribute dimensions. The sensitiv-
ity with which these upward and downward peaks are recognized depends
on sample size. The number and density of available observations may vary
dramatically across the social environment, and so does our ability to ªseeº
latently existing information. In the classroom, unequal samples can reflect
manifold factors, such as the students' presence, degree of participation, sitting
position, physical appearance and salience, and reaction speed of their contribu-
tions, and the teacher's relationship to students, his/her expectations and
hypotheses to be tested, his/her selective memory, and many other factors. Even
when teachers might be blamed for some of these factors, they are completely
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ªinnocentº for other. In either case, the effect is the same. Completely unbiased
information processing devices, such as connectionist judgment algorithms
(Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden; 1999; Fiedler, Kemmelmeier, & Freytag, 1999),
will produce biased judgments when fed with unequal stimulus samples.
OVERVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH
In the experiments to be reported, we offer revisited accounts for all three
types of expectancy biases in terms of predictor sampling or criterion sampling
processes. In Experiment 1, we first demonstrate that a universal regression
effect works against the overgeneralization of smart versus poor students.
True performance differences are generally underestimated, due to imperfect
environmental learning, the implication being that smart students are underes-
timated and poor students are overestimated. However, this generalized regres-
sion effect, which overrides a halo effect in favor of expectedly smart students,
is then moderated by a predictor sampling effect. As samples of observations
increase, regression should decrease so that the judged ability of smart students
should increase whereas the judged ability of poor students should decrease.
While Experiment 1 speaks to expectancies of the overgeneralization type,
Experiment 2 is concerned with expectancies derived from stereotypes. Rather
than leaving it up to teachers to gather information in an arbitrary fashion,
teachers are asked to test specific hypotheses about the assets of boys and girls
in different subject matters. When the task is to test stereotype-consistent
hypotheses (i.e., that boys are good in science and that girls have their assets
in language), teachers' positive testing strategies (Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel,
1999; Klayman & Ha, 1987) should produce larger samples for boys in science
and for girls in language lessons than vice versa. Only when such positive-
testing occurs, differential predictor sampling should tend to confirm the gender
stereotype. Holding ability constant, girls' talents should be more visible in
language and boys' assets should be more apparent in science. However, cru-
cially, when teachers are asked to test counter-stereotypical hypotheses, posi-
tive testing focuses on girls in science and on boys in language, resulting in
counter-stereotypical judgment biases of the same magnitude. Experiment 2
not only offers an alternative view on stereotyping but also a distinctive account
of positive testing effect (Klayman & Ha, 1987).
Finally, the focus of Experiment 3 is on expectancies based on scripted naõÈve
theories, with judgment biases deriving from criterion sampling. Ability of
students is held constant and only motivation (rate of raising hands) is allowed
to vary. In this situation, when teachers are nevertheless forced to judge ability,
they will very likely use scripted knowledge, inferring complete performance
(correct response) from incomplete observations (raising hands). However, we
show that this inference is sensitive to environmental base rates. When crite-
rion sampling produces constantly high ability feedback (i.e., raising hands is
mostly followed by correct responses), high motivation is used to infer high
ability. In contrast, in a constant low ability environment, raising hand is often
paired with failure so that motivation should be used as a proxy for low ability.
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Thus, the utilization of scripted expectancies is not guided by a blind heuristic
but by sensitive environmental learning.
To demonstrate these biases resulting from adaptive learning rather than
biased, expectancy-driven processes, we intentionally create demanding task
conditions, calling for multiple judgments of different students in various disci-
plines based on a few learning sessions. Such high cognitive load ought to
facilitate the sort of heuristic shortcuts that are commonly assumed to induce
expectancy-based guessing. Being unable (or unmotivated) to effectively encode
all the abundant information input, teachers might resort to quick and easy
(not to say ªdirtyº) heuristics. Judgments under high uncertainty might thus
be misled by simplifying generalizations, stereotypes, or scripted theories.
We do not pretend that expectancy biases of this kind do not exist. However,
as mentioned above, we advance the alternative, complementary assumption
that biases are not confined to cognitive misers but may even result from
unbiased processes, driven by high accuracy motivation (Chaiken, Liberman, &
Eagly, 1989). Based on considerable evidence for the accuracy of inductive-
statistic assessment (Greene, 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1984), especially when
stimuli can be assessed in natural frequency format (Gavanski & Hui, 1992;
Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), and based on our own recent
evidence (Fiedler et al., 2000), we assume that well-motivated teachers should
also exhibit this basic accuracy (cf. Jussim & Eccles, 1992). They should not
only succeed in assessing the average performance level of individual students
but also in making finer distinctions within students between different disci-
plines, and not confuse motivation and ability. However, this basic accuracy
(Jussim, 1989, 1991) holds relative to the samples observed, as distinguished
from the latent parameters of the environment (i.e., population). Sampling
variation should leave sufficient latitude for the occurrence of systematic biases.
The very accuracy with which judgments reflect properties of the effective
stimulus samples should thus produce systematic deviations from the latent
parameters.
EXPERIMENT 1
The first experiment is described in greater detail than subsequent ones,
which follow the same general method. To repeat, participants took the role
of a teacher of 16 students (sixth-graders) over up to eight lessons. After each
lesson, they rated each student's ability, motivation, and potential ability. The
actual differences in motivation and ability between students and disciplines
were manipulated (see below). We suspected that judgment accuracy would be
generally high, in spite of the complexity of the task. Nevertheless, systematic
biases should result from sampling effects. Experimental variables that affect
sample sizeÐsuch as student participation rate, focus of hypothesis tests, and
number of inference cuesÐshould thus produce systematic biases, even when
the translation process from samples to judgments is accurate.
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Method
Overview and Design
Each student in the stimulated school class represented a unique cell of a
within-judge design involving the factors student sex (boy vs girl), ability level
(high vs low) or motivation level (high vs low), and congruency (high vs mixed
vs low) with gender stereotypes regarding achievement in languages (English
or German, stereotypical asset of girls) versus sciences (Maths or Physics,
stereotypical asset of boys). This was accomplished by the systematic variation
of an ability parameter (probability of giving correct answers) and a motivation
parameter (probability of raising hands). The parameter matrix (Table 1)
assigns particular ability (or motivation) levels to the eight male and eight
female students. (Capital letters A and M refer to ability and motivation,
respectively). In addition to general performance differences between smart
students (0.5 , A , 0.8) and poor students (0.2 , A , 0.5) students, the
parameter matrix also reveals variation within male and female students
across subject matters (language vs science), providing the basis for manipulat-
ing stereotype congruency.
The only between-judge factor referred to the source of performance varia-
tion, which was either A or M. For one group of teachers, students differed
only in A, as described in Table 1, while all M parameters remained constant
TABLE 1
Parameter Matrix Describing the Ability (Probability of Correct Responses) or
Motivation (Participation Rate) of the 16 Target Students in the Experiment 1
Discipline type
German English Mathematics Physics
Students Lesson 1 Lesson 2 Lesson 1 Lesson 2 Lesson 1 Lesson 2 Lesson 1 Lesson 2
Male
1 .5 .5 .5 .5 .8 .8 .8 .8
2 .8 .8 .8 .8 .5 .5 .5 .5
3 .5 .5 .8 .8 .8 .8 .5 .5
4 .8 .8 .5 .5 .5 .5 .8 .8
5 .2 .2 .2 .2 .5 .5 .5 .5
6 .5 .5 .5 .5 .2 .2 .2 .2
7 .2 .2 .5 .5 .5 .5 .2 .2
8 .5 .5 .2 .2 .2 .2 .5 .5
Female
9 .8 .8 .8 .8 .5 .5 .5 .5
10 .5 .5 .5 .5 .8 .8 .8 .8
11 .8 .8 .5 .5 .5 .5 .8 .8
12 .5 .5 .8 .8 .8 .8 .5 .5
13 .5 .5 .5 .5 .2 .2 .2 .2
14 .2 .2 .2 .2 .5 .5 .5 .5
15 .5 .5 .2 .2 .2 .2 .5 .5
16 .2 .2 .5 .5 .5 .5 .2 .2
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at M 5 0.5. For example, the second matrix row pertains to a boy with generally
high ability (0.5 , A , 0.8, i.e., 50 to 80% correct answers). His ability pattern
is incongruent with the gender stereotype (better in language than in science),
but semantically consistent in that it varies only between but never within
disciplines types (language and science). The motivation of this student remains
invariant (M 5 0.5). For the other group of teachers, in contrast, the same
differences pertain to motivation (M as in Table 1), whereas ability is held
constant (A 5 0.5).
Participants
A total of 30 male and female native speakers (most of them students at the
University of Heidelberg) participated for payment (DEM 75.00). An equal
number of participants were randomly assigned to both groups of the source
of variation factor (A variable vs M variable).
Procedure
Participants were received individually. Written instructions made them
familiar with the general setting and with the basic features of the computer
program. Participants were asked to take the role of a teacher who is about
to take over a class of sixth-graders. They were informed that there would be
eight lessons (two each in the languages English and German, and the sciences
Physics and Maths), and that they would be asked to rate all students individu-
ally after each lesson. Participants learned that they would teach two lessons
in each of the first four experimental sessions.
Instructions also described the pull-down menus employed for the selection
of questions. Teachers learned that they could call upon only those students
who actually raised their hands, and that feedback would be given about
whether an answer was right or wrong. An opportunity was given to ask
questions about the general procedure, before the experimenter started the
first session.
The computer program started with a description of all submenus available
at the start of every experimental session. These submenus comprised reread-
ing the extended version of the general instruction, looking at photographs of
individual students, inspecting today's schedule of lessons, and scanning the
item pools of specific lessons (each consisting of 20 items). Items had been
taken from regular sixth-graders' textbooks (plus some items generated by the
authors themselves) and were of apparently equal difficulty, according to a
pretest. Participants were reminded that they would be asked to judge ability
and motivation after each lesson. Afterward participants spent 10 to 15 min
looking through item pools and photographs, before they decided to start the
first lesson.
Giving lessons. In each experimental session, participants gave lessons in
one subject out of each of the two discipline types, sciences and languages. The
following constant ordering of lessons was used: German/fables and Physics/
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heat (session 1), Maths/set theory and English/grammar (session 2), Maths/
measurement units and German/orthography (session 3), and English/speech
exercises and Physics/electricity (session 4).
The lessons subroutine involved participants in a sequence of question-asking
trials and a final performance judgment. Every trial began with the complete
menu of the 20 items available for that lesson. Teachers selected one item per
trial by moving the cursor up and down the item list and striking the return
key when the chosen item was highlighted. The computer then displayed the
classroom, showing 16 students sitting in different locations, with rectangles
symbolizing the individual students' desk. Those students that raised their
hands in response to the selected question were marked (cf. Fig. 1). It was only
from these students, selected by a random generator at a rate specified by the
parameter M, that a response could be solicited. Teachers selected one student
by moving the cursor onto the student's name and then striking the return
key. The student's desk was immediately replaced by a box with one of two
possible captions: either the word ªrightº or the word ªwrongº blinking for three
seconds (cf. Fig. 1), indicating whether the student had delivered a correct
answer (randomly generated with probability A). After the feedback, the com-
puter returned to the item menu and the teacher selected the next question.
Teachers could ask the same question repeatedly if they wanted to compare
several students' ability. The program allowed for different subsets of students
raising their hands when the same question was asked repeatedly. To forestall
inconsistent response patterns, repeated answers of the same student to the
same item yielded the same feedback. The program kept participants in the
ask-and-call-upon loop for 20 min and then switched to the dependent measures
irrespective of how many trials a participant had run. The whole session was
registered and stored for later data analyses, including the temporal order
with which specific questions had been asked, the choice latencies, the student
that had been called upon, and whether the answer was correct.
Manipulation of students' behavior. As evident from Table 1 above, per-
formance (either A or M, dependent on the experimental group) varied over
students as well as lessons. The experimental variables were defined in terms
of these parameters. The students' general level of ability/motivation was either
high (students 1±4 and 9±12, with parameters in the range of 0.8 to 0.5) or
low (students 5±8 and 13±16, with parameters in the range (0.2 to 0.5). Each
student's performance pattern across lessons could be classified by stereotype
congruency, as congruent (students 1, 5, 9, 13), incongruent (students 2, 6, 10,
14), or mixed (students 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16). As already mentioned, the
resulting student profiles could be semantically consistent with the similarity
structure of disciplines (equal performance within language and science and
differences only between; students 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14) or inconsistent
(variation within language and science; students 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16). Note
that only semantically consistent patterns can be congruent or incongruent
with the gender stereotype, whereas inconsistent students are stereotypically
mixed. The allocation of student names to sitting positions (desks) was held
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constant (as in Fig. 1) but the assignment of parameter conditions (matrix
rows) to the eight boys and the eight girls was randomized for each teacher.
Dependent measures. At the end of each lesson, teachers rated all students
for ability andÐin order to differentiate between various aspects of per-
formanceÐalso for motivation in that lesson and for their expectations about
performance (potential ability). To reduce same-response tendencies across the
three ratings, participants first rated all students for ability, then in a second
run for motivation, and finally for potential ability. All ratings were delivered
on 50-point graphical ratings, in response to the prompt ªPlease estimate, for
all students, the percentage of all answers in this lesson that were correctº
(ability), ª. . . the percentage of questions when a student had raised his/her
handº (motivation), and ª. . . what percentage of correct answers a student
would have given even when he/she did not raise his/her hand?º (potential
ability). The sitting position determined the order of student ratings, from the
upper left to the lower right. Thus, the design confounds all four principally
uncontrollable factors, sitting position, name, appearance, and rating position.
However, as assignment of parameter values to individual students was ran-
domized, this should not undermine the results.
When participants had completed all dependent measures, they were inter-
viewed carefully to see whether they had any suspicion about the ªreal objectiveº
of the experiment and to gather demographical data. Finally, participants were
thanked, debriefed, and paid.
Results
We confine the reported analyses to the two main ratings of ability and
motivation; the third rating, concerning potential ability, was largely redundant
with the ability ratings and did not add any further evidence. Preliminary
analyses revealed no differences as a function of participant gender; all analyses
are therefore pooled over this factor.
Percentage judgments on the graphical 50-step scale were transformed, for
convenience, to the same proportion scale (between 0 and 1) as the parameter
matrices. Data analyses can be conducted with teachers or students as the
unit of analysis. Thus, one can enter judgments of all 16 students, averaged
over all teachers (of the same condition), and then treat these student scores
as a random variable. Alternatively, one can use teachers as the unit of analysis,
averaging first over subgroups of (e.g., high vs low level of ability/motivation;
male vs female) students, treating teachers' scores as a random variable. We
will sometimes switch between both modes of analysis. For instance, to evaluate
the accuracy of the judgments, it is natural to use students as the unit of
analysis, because the distal parameters pertain to students. In contrast, the
total group of 16 students is too small to allow for multiple splits by level, sex,
stereotype congruency, and semantic consistency. Such analyses are therefore
based on individual teacher's scores for various types of students.
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Basic Accuracy and Fairness
For a first overall test of judgment accuracy, the mean judgments (pooled
over teachers) of the 16 students were analyzed in a three-factorial analysis of
variance (ANOVA) involving performance level (A/M high vs low) as a between-
student factor and discipline types (language vs science) and source of variation
(A-variable vs M-variable) as within-student factors. To obtain the discipline
type factor, judgments were averaged across all four language lessons (two
German and two English) and across all four science lessons (two Physics and
two Maths). The bar chart in Fig. 2 gives the mean ratings as a function of
these factors, with regard to ability and motivation.
The ANOVA for ability (A) judgments yields a significant main effect for
performance levels, F(1, 14) 5 25.52, p , .001, reflecting markedly higher A
judgments for the eight high-level students than for the eight low-level stu-
dents. This main effect is qualified by a levels 3 source of variation interaction,
F(1, 14) 5 9.41, p , .01. Judged A differences between smart and poor students
are correctly confined to the A-variable condition. Thus, judges can differentiate
clearly between variation in A and M. Separate two-way ANOVAs confirm that
the levels main effect is apparent for the A-variable condition, F(1, 14) 5 42.08,
p , .001, but not for the M-variable condition, F(1, 14) 5 1.02.
The same ANOVA performed on motivation (M) ratings also yields a motiva-
tion levels main effect, F(1, 14) 5 77.19, p , .001, and a levels 3 source of
variation interaction, F(1, 14) 5 40.62, p , .001, restricting the levels main
FIG. 2. Mean judgments of ability and motivation in Experiment 1 by performance level,
discipline type, and source of variation.
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effect to the condition in which the variation is actually due to M. In separate
ANOVAs, the levels main effect is obtained only when the variation is in M,
F(1, 14) 5 73.32, p , .001, as opposed to A, F(1, 14) 5 0.05. Two minor,
unpredicted effects emerge for M judgments, a source of variation main effect,
F(1, 14) 5 5.57, p , .05, and a discipline type 3 source of variation interaction,
F(1, 14) 5 5.92, p , .05, indicating somewhat enhanced ratings in science for
constant M.
Regressiveness
In these overall analyses, evaluations of individual students are quite sensi-
tive to actually existing differences (Fig. 2). Nevertheless, judgments do deviate
systematically from the objective parameters due to a pervasive regression
effectÐa typical sign of incomplete environmental learning. Actually high abil-
ity (0.8) is underestimated and actually low ability (0.2) is overestimated, with
no systematic deviation for intermediate (0.5) ability (see Fig. 3). Consistent
with normal learning principles, regression is strongest in the first session and
decreases with learning experience (i.e., with growing samples), as evident
from Fig. 3. This pattern is not in line with a perpetuating expectancy effect
based on overgeneralizations of the initial classification of smart versus poor
students. Rather, smart students suffer and poor students profit from the
pervasive regression effect.
Reliability
The gradual learning of distal ability parameters over growing samples of
observations is also apparent in measures of interjudge reliability. Treating
the 15 judges in each condition like items of a test, it is possible to compute
the internal consistency with which different judges converge in discriminating
between students (Rosenthal, 1987). For A ratings, the effective interjudge
reliability starts at a level of 0.26 and 0.42 in the first two lessons, and their
FIG. 3. Mean judgments of ability in Experiment 1 by parameter A and session.
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systematic agreement raises to 0.88 and 0.79 in the last two lessons (in the
A-variable condition). Interestingly, M ratings are rather reliable from the
beginning, starting from 0.67 and 0.82 and ending at 0.85 and 0.73. This high
initial level reflects the larger data base and higher reliability of M than A
judgments. All students' motivation (i.e., whether they raise their hands) is
visible for every question the teacher directs at the class, but ability can be
observed only in one student per question.
Sampling Errors
Sampling effects provide a crucial mediator for understanding the deviations
of teacher judgments from the latent A and M parameters. Consider first the
fact that sample statistics may deviate from the population parameters. The
average correlation, within individual judges across the 16 3 8 matrix cells,
between the A parameters and the actually obtained sample statistic for each
student in each lesson amounts to 0.68. A judgments in turn correlate 0.47 on
average with the actually observed sample statistics. The resulting average
correlation between A parameters and A judgments is only 0.35. M judgments,
by comparison, correlate similarly with M parameters (0.41) and samples (0.42)
because the M samples correlate almost perfectly with the M parameters (0.98),
due to the larger number and reliability of M observations.
Sample-Size Effects
Our major predictions relate judgment biases to variations in sample size.
The regressive tendency to underestimate high performance and to overesti-
mate low performance should decrease with increasing sample size. Of two
equally smart students, the one with the larger sample of observations should
be judged smarter. In contrast, of two equally poor students, the one with
the larger sample should appear even poorer. Sample size should have little
influence on judgments of intermediate students. Note that this prediction of
enhanced discrimination with increasing amount of information (i.e., sample
size) reflects a genuine learning effect and cannot be attributed to heuristic
guessing, which should be maximal under high uncertainty (i.e., small
samples).
The sample-size argument amounts to testing a three-way interaction, in-
volving ability levels (high vs low), sample size (large vs small), and an informa-
tiveness factor that contrasts those cells of the parameter matrix where the
student's high or low performance is actually manifested (parameter Þ 0.5)
to those cells where performance differences among students are invisible
(parameter 5 0.5). The sampling accountÐas opposed to a common expectancy
accountÐpredicts that teacher ratings should discriminate between smart and
poor students only where differences actually exist, and only when samples
are large enough.
Accordingly, we calculated four repeated measures for each student: (a) across
all lessons in which this student had an informative parameter and across all
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teachers who drew a large sample on this student, (b) across informative lessons
and across teachers drawing small samples; (c) across uninformative lessons
and teachers drawing large samples; and (d) across uninformative lessons and
teachers drawing small samples. In this analysis, ªlargeº and ªsmallº samples
are defined as above versus below the individual teachers' median sample size.
Results are summarized in Fig. 4.
As predicted, existing A differences (in the A-variable condition) are extracted
more readily when samples are large rather than small. In the ANOVA of A
ratings, a main effect for levels, F(1, 14) 5 48.72, p , .001, replicates the
clear discrimination between smart and poor students. Two-way interactions
indicate that this main effect is confined to those informative lessons where
high versus low ability is actually manifested (in A Þ .5), levels 3 informa-
tiveness, F(1, 14) 5 68.97, p , .001, and where samples are large rather than
small, levels 3 sample size, F(1, 14) 5 42.36, p , .001. Most importantly, the
crucial three-way interaction, F(1, 14) 5 27.49, p , .001, confirms that smart
and poor students are properly discriminated only when samples are large
and informative.
The same ANOVA performed for M judgments, given a variable M, yields a
strong levels main effect, F(1, 14) 5 112.46, p , .001, and a levels 3 informa-
tiveness interaction, F(1, 14) 5 82.54, p , .001, indicating that judged M
differences are largely confined to those lessons where M differences actually
exist. Notably, the M levels 3 sample-size interaction is also significant, F(1,
14) 5 7.33, p , .05. This means that letting students respond renders teachers
more sensitive to motivational differences than merely passively observing
them while they raise their hands or not.
Pragmatic Confusion
Although there was little confusion of A and M in the overall analysis (see
above), a more refined analysis reveals several noteworthy interactions of
motivation and ability. When only M varies, A judgments produce a levels 3
sample size interaction, F(1, 14) 5 6.86, p , .05. Motivated students who raise
their hands more often than justified by their performance, receive lower A
FIG. 4. Mean judgments of ability in Experiment 1 by performance level, sample size, and
informativeness when A is variable.
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ratings than less motivated students (0.51 vs 0.54) when rich samples make
the discrepancy apparent. In contrast, when samples are impoverished, judges
begin to confuse motivation and ability, giving higher A judgments when M is
high than low (0.52 vs 0.46). Thus the uncertainty of impoverished A samples
facilitates the use of M as a proxy to A.
A sample-size main effect in M ratings, F(1, 14) 5 6.33, p , .05, reflects
another intriguing pragmatic illusion; teachers misattribute their self-selected
samples to the preferred students' motivation. That is, they believe that stu-
dents at whom they have directed many questions have raised their hands
more often than students they have themselves neglected. A similar sample-
size main effect is obtained for M ratings in the A-variable condition, F(1,
14) 5 13.04, p , .01. Teachers tend to attribute high M to students from which
they have themselves solicited large samples.
Stereotype Expectancies
An analysis of the role of gender stereotypes must be confined to those
eight students (with a semantically consistent performance pattern) whose
performance was either congruent or incongruent with gender stereotypes (see
Table 1). Consider first the A ratings in the M-variable condition. An ANOVA
(using judges as unit of analysis) involving performance levels (M high vs
low) 3 stereotype congruency (congruent vs incongruent students) yielded a
levels 3 stereotype congruency interaction, F(1, 30) 5 7.50, p , .05. In ratings
of counter-stereotypical targets, a high (vs low) motivation level serves to de-
crease A ratings (0.51 vs 0.55). Apparently, when students raise their hands
ªtooº often in the wrong domain, the modest impression caused by only 50%
correct answers gets even worse. This does not hold for stereotype-congruent
situations (0.53 vs 0.51), where enhanced motivation tends to be used as a cue
to enhanced ability.
M judgments in the M-variable condition yield an interaction, too, F(1,
30) 5 6.06, p , .05. Actual differences between high and low M students are
extracted more readily for stereotype-congruent (0.58 vs 0.45) than stereotype-
incongruent targets (0.55 vs 0.50). Together, these findings suggest that motiva-
tional differences are slightly less likely to be discounted when they are sup-
ported by common gender stereotypes.
Discussion
The findings reported thus far provide some initial support for the implica-
tions of the sampling approach and the underlying environmental learning
framework. In the complex, cognitively demanding task setting, there was no
breakdown of systematic information processing due to capacity limitations.
Unlike a cognitive miser who prefers shallow, heuristic processing most of the
time (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and who is guided by top-down guessing rather
than data assessment, the typical teacher in the simulated classroom assessed
the actually observed data quite accurately. Despite the complexity of 128
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judgments (16 students 3 8 disciplines) on several dimensions, they succeeded
in differentiating smart and poor students, motivated and unmotivated ones.
These differences were not overgeneralized but restricted to those specific
lessons where the high or low performance of students was actually manifested.
The average teacher's ability ratings correlate 0.47 with the actual sample
statistics to which they have been exposed, after only about 20 min experience
in each lesson. Aggregated over teachers, this correlation raises to 0.77.
With regard to the first type of teacher expectanciesÐovergeneralizations
of global differences between smart and poor studentsÐwe did not find evidence
for an a priori expectancy effect of the halo type. If anything, regressive judg-
ments created unfairness in the opposite direction. Smart students tended to
be underestimated, whereas poor students received too favorable judgments.
However, as regression depends on sample size (reliability), discrimination
between smart and poor students was enhanced as sample size increased.
Thus, instead of a global-expectancy bias in favor of students initially classified
as smart, what we find is a relative decline of the disadvantage of smart
students with increasing sample size. The major determinant of this judgment
bias, sample size, is an environmental property rather than a biased process
within the teacher, due to prior expectations. A similar conclusion holds for
the influence of gender stereotypes that is generally small and visible only
when samples are impoverished.
EXPERIMENT 2
Stereotypes are considered a major source of expectancies and self-fulfilling
processes (cf. Brophy, 1983). For instance, gender stereotypes may suggest that
boys are better than girls in maths and science whereas girls outperform boys
in language and maybe arts. We do not want to contest the prior-expectancy
role of stereotypes. However, the purpose of Experiment 2 is to highlight an
alternative process by which gender stereotypes can produce a bias in the
evaluation of boys and girls. This alternative process relies solely on different
sampling behavior that may beÐbut need not beÐsolicited by stereotypical
beliefs. Teachers who believe that boys dominate in science may sample more
observations about boys than girls in maths, or more observations about girls
than boys in language lessons. Such a focused sampling strategy alone, com-
monly referred to as positive testing (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Laughlin, Magley, &
Shupe, 1997), should induce a systematic bias on subsequent judgments, ac-
cording to the sample-size principle introduced in Experiment 1. Large samples
should enhance reliability and attenuate the basic regression effect, facilitating
the discrimination of smart versus poor students. Given large samples for boys
in maths or science, judgments of smart boys should increase and judgments
of poor boys should decrease, relative to smart and poor girls. Conversely,
the discrimination between smart and poor girls should be accentuated in
languages, assuming larger samples for girls than boys.
However, importantly, the alternative process we are proposing is not intrin-
sically biased toward prior stereotypical beliefs, but a learning function of
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variable sample size. The stereotype-congruent prediction holds only as long
as sampling behavior is determined by the gender stereotype. The basic inde-
pendence from prior expectancies can be demonstrated when teachers are asked
to test counter-stereotypical hypotheses, that is, whether girls have assets in
maths and science and boys in language. Positive testing (i.e., larger samples
for girls in maths and for boys in language) should then foster accentuated
ratings of girls in science and boys in language. This pattern is clearly distinct
from a common expectancy effect, which would invariantly predict enhanced
or accentuated judgments of boys and girls in their gender-typed domains.
That sample-size effects can override expectancies could be already demon-
strated in recent experiments (cf. Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999). The present
research not only constitutes an attempt to apply this replicable finding (see
also Fiedler, Kemmelmeier, & Freytag, 1999; Semin & Strack, 1980) to the
explanation of teacher judgment biases but also highlights important ecological
constraints. Our cognitive±environmental framework predicts clearly specified
boundary conditions for the predicted judgment biases. Granting that judgment
biases are actually mediated by sample size, the predicted effects should be
obtained only where teachers actually engage in positive testing. To meet this
condition, it is essential that the environment support the sampling process.
That is, a sufficient number of boys and girls must raise their hands in the
respective domain to allow for positive testing. Otherwise, the process lead-
ing to sample-based judgment biases should be inhibited. The influence of
focused attention should vanish if the stimulus environment does not support
the information search process (cf. Fiedler, Armbruster, Nickel, Walther, &
Asbeck, 1996).
Accordingly, teachers in Experiment 2 were instructed to test specific hypoth-
eses that were either consistent or inconsistent with common gender stereo-
types. In the consistent condition, teachers tested the hypothesis that girls
show enhanced performance in language and boys in science. However, in a
repeated-measures design, each judge was also to test counterstereotypical
hypotheses, namely that girls have their assets in science and boys in lan-
guages. By this manipulation, the hypothesis focus and its influence on sample
size were detached from the impact of a priori stereotypes. The A parameter
matrix included both boys and girls who confirm and disconfirm gender stereo-
types, although the entire gender groups did not differ in either language or
science. M parameters were manipulated to either facilitate or inhibit positive
testing (in terms of the number of boys and girls who raise their hands).
Method
Participants and Design
A total of 32 men and women participated in the experiment either for course
credit or for payment (DEM 50.00). An equal number of participants were
randomly assigned to eight conditions resulting from three between-subject
factors, environmental support (positive testing supported by M parameters
vs not), lesson order (languages in the first vs second experimental session),
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and allocation of stereotype-congruent and incongruent hypotheses to disci-
plines (e.g., testing that girls are good at English and Physics vs girls good at
German and Maths). The combinations of hypotheses to be tested and lesson
orders are given in Table 2.
The last two factors were not of theoretical interest but merely intended to
control for interactions involving gender, subject matter, and lesson order. As
all results were unaffected by these variations, data were collapsed over these
technical factors. As in Experiment 1, various within-judges contrasts were
included in the data analyses (see Results), pertaining to performance level
(smart vs poor), gender (boys vs girls), or disciplines (language vs science).
Materials and Procedure
The A parameter matrix was modified slightly to include only stereotype-
congruent and incongruent conditions, but no mixed conditions. As shown in
Table 3, within all subgroups of four smart (A 5 0.8 or 0.5) and poor (A 5 0.2
or 0.5) boys and girls, the between-disciplines variation confirmed the gender
stereotype for one pair (i.e., girls being better in language and boys on science)
and disconfirmed the stereotype for the other pair. Thus, the overall A pattern
neither confirmed nor disconfirmed the stereotype.
The M parameter matrix was manipulated in the following way to either
support positive testing or not. In the nonsupportive environment, the partici-
pation rate for all students in all lessons was held constant at M 5 0.5. In the
environment supposed to support positive testing, motivation (raising hand
rate) was high (M 5 0.8 or 0.5) for girls and low for boys (M 5 0.2 or 0.5) in
those lessons in which the hypothesis to be tested focused on girls, but M was
higher for boys than girls in lessons with a hypothesis focus on boys. Within
each pair of students who shared the same gender and parameter pattern (see
last paragraph), one received the informative M parameter (i.e., 0.8 and 0.2)
and the other received the uninformative parameter (0.5 and 0.5).
The general procedure remained invariant, except for changes in instructions
necessary to introduce the specific hypotheses to be tested. Teachers were now
provided with information about the gender group's assets stemming from the
alleged former teacher of the class. To introduce a hypothesis testing perspec-
tive, the following paragraph was inserted in the general instructions:
TABLE 2
Sequence of Lessons in Different Subjects in Experiment 2
Session Group A Group B Group C Group D
1 German C German I Maths C Maths I
2 Physics I Physics C English I English C
3 Maths C Maths I German C German I
4 English I English C Physics I Physics C
Note. C, hypotheses consistent with gender stereotype; I, inconsistent.
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TABLE 3
Parameter Matrix Describing the Ability (Probability of Correct Responses) of the
16 Target Students in Experiment 2
Discipline type
Students German English Mathematics Physics
Male
1 .8 .8 .5 .5
2 .8 .8 .5 .5
3 .5 .5 .8 .8
4 .5 .5 .8 .8
5 .5 .5 .2 .2
6 .5 .5 .2 .2
7 .2 .2 .5 .5
8 .2 .2 .5 .5
Female
9 .8 .8 .5 .5
10 .8 .8 .5 .5
11 .5 .5 .8 .8
12 .5 .5 .8 .8
13 .5 .5 .2 .2
14 .5 .5 .2 .2
15 .2 .2 .5 .5
16 .2 .2 .5 .5
You already had a talk with your predecessor about your pupils' strengths.
In individual lessons you are now going to test the supposition that. . .
. . . girls show good performance in German.
. . . girls show good performance in Physics.
. . . boys show good performance in Mathematics.
. . . boys show good performance in English.
The specific gender and subject combinations varied according to the experi-
mental condition. Participants were told that the individual hypotheses would
be repeated at the beginning of the lessons in the respective disciplines. Partic-
ipants taught only one lesson per subject; extended teaching over more lessons
might have counteracted the hypothesized positive-testing strategies.
Results and Discussion
For ease of presentation, we report separate analyses for stereotype-consis-
tent and -inconsistent hypotheses and for motivation environments that sup-
port versus inhibit positive testing. Recall that each judge tested one consistent
and one inconsistent hypothesis in both the language domain and the sci-
ence domain.
Positive Testing
First, a positive-test score was computed for each teacher in each discipline,
defined as the difference between the proportions of hypothesis-matching ques-
tions and mismatching questions. For instance, if the hypothesis refers to girl's
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superiority in maths, the positive-test score would be the proportion of maths
questions asked to girls minus the proportion asked to boys. These scores
provided the input to ANOVAs including the factors ability level (high-A vs
low-A students) 3 discipline type (language vs science) 3 student sex (male
vs female), conducted separately for environments that support or inhibit posi-
tive testing.
When the motivation parameters M support the hypothesis being tested (i.e.,
when plenty of girls raise their hands to test a hypothesis about girls), positive
testing is evident in marked discipline type 3 student sex interactions. For
stereotype-consistent hypotheses, judges asked girls more often (7.45) than
boys (5.05) in language and more boys (7.35) than girls (5.15) in science, F(1,
15) 5 61.50, p , .001. When inconsistent hypotheses were being tested, a
reversed positive-testing effect is equally strong, such that teachers asked more
boys (7.36) than girls (5.14) in language and more girls (7.52) than boys (4.97)
in science, F(1, 15) 5 59.49, p , .001. Positive testing does not interact with
other factors.
As predicted, positive testing is greatly reduced or even eliminated when
the environment does not support the hypothesis being tested, confirming the
important role of environmental support. When the cooperation rate of boys
and girls in language and science inhibits the sampling of hypothesis-congruent
information, the discipline type 3 student sex interaction disappears for consis-
tent hypotheses, F(1, 15) 5 0.84, and reduces to F(1, 15) 5 7.36, p , .05, for
inconsistent hypotheses.
From Positive Testing to Judgment Biases
To test the major theoretical prediction concerning the mediational role of
positive testing in the formation of judgment biases, we conducted discipline
type (language vs science) 3 positive test (present vs absent) 3 student sex
ANOVAs. Positive testing was assumed to be present (absent) in those teachers
who had gathered a higher number (a lower or equal number) of questions
matching the hypothesis than mismatching questions. For convenience, we
reduce the complexity by reporting separate analyses for different environmen-
tal boundary conditions.
Environments Supporting Positive Testing
Let us first consider an environment in which students' motivation facilitates
positive testing. Let us further concentrate on judgments of cases (student±
discipline combinations) where the actual ability is high (A 5 0.8) and the
hypotheses being tested are consistent with gender stereotypes. Mean A judg-
ments (Table 4) under these conditions show a marked confirmation bias. Girls
receive higher ratings than boys in language and lower ratings in science, and
this pattern is almost exclusively due to those cases in which judges actually
engage in positive testing. This pattern is evident in a discipline type 3 student
sex interaction, F(1, 15) 5 10.66, p , .01, and most crucially, a significant
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TABLE 4
Judgments of Ability When Ability Is High (0.8) by Environments Support of the
Hypothesis Being Tested in Experiment 2
Consistent with stereotype Inconsistent with stereotype
Positive testing No pos. testing Positive testing No pos. testing
Environment Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Supporting
Language 0.72 0.52 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.65 0.63 0.58
Science 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.54 0.60 0.51 0.60 0.55
Inhibiting
Language 0.65 0.55 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.57 0.65 0.62
Science 0.58 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.63
Note. Underlining indicates those cases that are focused in the hypotheses being tested.
three-way interaction, F(1, 15) 5 6.42, p , .05, restricting the effect to the
presence of positive testing. An additional student sex main effect, F(1, 15) 5
5.11, p , .05, reflects somewhat more benevolent judgments of girls than boys.
Of special theoretical value is the condition in which the hypotheses being
tested are stereotype-inconsistent so that alternative interpretations in terms
of expectancies are ruled out. As apparent in Table 4, the same sampling-
dependent bias is evident in a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 15) 5
10.27, p , .01. When judges engage in positive testing, girls receive higher
ratings than boys in science (!) and lower ratings in language (!), and this
pattern disappears when judges do not gather positive-test samples. No other
result is significant.
When we consider judgments of cases (student±discipline combinations) with
low ability (A 5 0.2), the qualitative pattern of means is reversed but much
weaker; the three-way interactions do not become significant. This means
that judges are more contingent on observations of accomplishments than on
failures, which may reflect the fact that hypothesis testing instructions focused
on assets rather than deficits (see above). Importantly, however, when we
compute each judge's ratings of high-A cases minus his/her ratings of low-A
cases, the crucial three-way interaction appears for judgments of ability when
testing consistent hypotheses, F(1, 15) 5 6.04, p , .05, and when testing
inconsistent hypotheses, F(1, 15) 5 11.59, p , .01.
M judgments reflect the judges' general sensitivity to the fact that, in a
supporting environment, motivation is enhanced for those disciplines that are
in the focus of hypothesis testing, as manifested in discipline type 3 student
sex interactions for both consistent hypotheses, F(1, 15) 5 11.52, p , .01, and
inconsistent hypotheses, F(1, 15) 5 21.82, p , .001. Motivation is correctly
recognized as elevated for those gender±discipline combinations that are under
focus (mean 5 0.625) and as reduced for the complementary combinations
(0.482), indicating that the M manipulation was effective. Moreover, discipline
type 3 student sex 3 positive test interactions, F(1, 15) 5 9.23, p , .01, and
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F(1, 15) 5 7.69, p , .05, indicate that this variation in motivation is more
clearly detected when positive testing is used.
Environments Inhibiting Positive Testing
In contrast, when there is no environmental support for judges' positive
testing, that is, when students' cooperation rates do not provide affordances
for sample-size effects, the influence of hypothesis focus on A ratings disappears
largely (see bottom of Table 4). The crucial three-way interactions are no longer
significant (Fs , 1.6). Although in this condition we can still distinguish positive
and negative testing at a qualitative level, the quantitative sample-size effect
is too weak (see above) to produce noticeable judgment biases.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 addresses the last type of expectancy effects, originating in
naõÈve theories or scripts about the genesis of correct (vs incorrect) student
responses. Especially when student ability is hard to discern while motivation
is more visible, teachers may utilize M cues to infer A, relying on scripted
knowledge that raising hands is often the first step in an episode resulting in
a correct (or incorrect) answer. If so, a constructive version of an expectancy
bias may be obtained. Judgments of manifestly observed performance (i.e.,
proportion of correct answers) may be confused with inferences derived from
scripted knowledge. Even when incomplete episodes of a student's raising hand
does not receive as much weight as complete episodes of a correct response,
the teacher's effective performance sample may increase with the number of
M cues, based on a scripted inferences sequence: student raises hand fi teacher
notices fi teacher asks the student fi student responds fi response is correct.
To provide the stage for such a constructive (i.e., inference-based) version of
an expectancy effect, the ability level of all students was held constant and
only their motivation was allowed to vary. However, in different experimental
environments, ability was either constantly high (A 5 0.7) or constantly low
(A 5 0.3). When teachers are asked to rate student ability in the absence of
any variation in A, chances should be high that M variation intrudes into A
judgments. The precise pattern of this effect should be revealing about the
process underlying the expectancy effect. The traditional heuristic account
would predict that under high uncertainty (i.e., when differences in A are
restricted to sampling variation), judges should resort to simplifying heuristics
such as the assumption that a student who raises her hand is likely to know
the correct response. Heuristics are assumed to be applied in a routinized
manner; that is, students who raise their hand often should receive higher
ability judgments. In contrast, extending the environmental learning approach
to constructive inferences predicts a more differentiated pattern. M cues will
be used differentially in high-A and low-A environments. In a smart base rate
environment (A 5 0.7), judges learn to associate M (raising hand) with success,
whereas in a poor environment, they should associate M with a high number
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of failures. Accordingly, high-M students should receive more favorable ratings
than low-M students when A 5 0.7, but high M should lead to more negative
A ratings than low M when A 5 0.3, as the base rate of failure after raising
hands is high.
Such an adaptive, base rate-sensitive use of scripted knowledge is different
from the notion of heuristic shortcuts. Our revisited environmental-learning
approach suggests that the utilization of environmental base rates can also be
understood within the sampling framework. Accordingly, the virtual stimulus
sample for each student consists of (a) the subsample of observed complete
performance episodes and (b) the subsample of incomplete inferred performance
episodes. The first component (a) does not discriminate between students be-
cause A is constant; the expected level for the entire class is either high (A 5
0.7) or low (A 5 0.3). However, the second component (b) should induce a
systematic bias. Depending on whether teachers have learned to associate M
with success or failure, increasing the number M-based inferences should either
increase or decrease ratings of A. If judgments are in this way sensitive to
virtual sample size, the predicted impact of M on A (polarized A judgments
for high M students) should be restricted to those informative lessons in which
students actually show their high versus low motivation (i.e., where M is
manifested in sample size). Polarized judgments of high-M students should




A total of 30 male and female native speakers (most of them students at the
University of Heidelberg) participated for payment (DEM 75.00; approximately
$40). An equal number of participants were randomly assigned to the two
levels of the only between-subjects factor, ability level (A set to a constant value
of 0.3 vs 0.7). For all participants, the M parameter varied across students,
according to the same parameter matrix as in Experiment 1 (see Table 1).
Various contrasts between dependent measures were included as within-
subjects factors in the data analyses.
Procedure
The same procedure was used as in Experiment 1, except for necessary
changes to the underlying parameter matrices. Thus, while the experimental
situation remained unchanged at surface level, the latent parameters of stu-
dents' performance underwent important changes.
Results
It was predicted that when ability is invariantly high (A 5 0.7), motivated
students should receive higher A judgments than less motivated students.
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Conversely, when ability is constantly low (A 5 0.3), motivated students should
receive generally lower judgments. This pattern should be confined to informa-
tive lessons where differences in M are actually present in virtual samples.
An overall ANOVA of A ratings included three factors, ability baserate
(A 5 0.7 vs A 5 0.3) 3 discipline types (languages vs science) 3 motivation
levels (high vs low M), the last factor being between students and the first two
factors within students. A huge ability base rate main effect, F(1, 14) 5 238.45,
p , .001, reflects higher ratings when the A base rate is 0.7 rather than low
0.3. As usual, however, judgments were regressive (mean ratings 0.609 vs
0.366), failing to extract the full size of the A manipulation.
More importantly, the ability baserate 3 motivation level interaction, F(1,
14) 5 5.79, p , .05, confirms the main prediction that in a high-ability environ-
ment (A 5 0.7) the judged ability of high-M students is higher (0.626) than for
low-M students (0.593), whereas in low-ability environments (A 5 0.3), A rat-
ings for high-M students exhibit an opposite bias (0.35 compared with 0.39
for low-M). This pattern is consistent with an adaptive learning process as
distinguished from a stimulus-insensitive heuristic. The only other effect is
due to the base rate 3 discipline types interaction, F(1, 14) 5 5.81, p , .05,
reflecting stronger discrimination for sciences than for languages.
Further evidence for the stimulus learning approach comes from more refined
analyses that include motivation level and two other factors: informative les-
sons (when high or low M is manifested at M 5 0.7 or 0.3) and uninformative
lessons (when the same students' M becomes 0.5; see Table 1) and judgments
based on large versus small samples (i.e., samples above vs below each individ-
ual teacher's median sample size for all students). Thus, ratings of the same
high-M and low-M students were averaged separately over lessons in which
M was informative or not, and over teachers who gathered large or small
students of those students. For convenience, separate ANOVAs were conducted
for high-A and low-A environments. In both analyses, the informativeness 3
motivation level interaction was significant, F(1, 14) 5 8.08, p , .05 (for A 5
0.7) and F(1, 14) 5 12.31, p , .01 (for A 5 0.3), indicating that polarized A
judgments of high and low M students are not overgeneralized but restricted
to those lessons where M samples actually vary (see Table 5).
The ANOVA of M ratings yields a strong M levels main effect, F(1, 14) 5
250.27, p , .001, reflecting the true M differences. Confusion of M and A is
evident in a strong main effect for A base rates, F(1, 14) 5 43.32, p , .001.
TABLE 5
Judgments of Ability as a Function of Motivation Level, Informativeness, and
Ability Environment in Experiment 3
Informative Uninformative
Ability environment High M Low M High M Low M
When A 5 0.7 0.64 0.58 0.62 0.62
When A 5 0.3 0.32 0.48 0.38 0.38
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Teachers erroneously inferred from generally high A (0.7) a higher degree of M
(0.551) than from low A (0.473). No other effect reaches statistical significance.
Discussion
Experiment 3 corroborates the contention that the sampling approach can
be extended from objectively observed performance to subjective inferences of
ability based on motivational cues. When there are many M cues, A judgments
are enhanced or reduced, depending on whether the motivational cue (raising
hand) is associated with a high or low ability base rate. This context-sensitive
use of M cues in different environments cannot be explained in terms of rigid
heuristics but calls for a more flexible, stimulus-sensitive account. If student
participation (high M) was frequently met with success, teachers inferred high
A from high M. Conversely, if motivation often cooccurred with failure, they
inferred reduced A from high M. This holds only for those lessons that actually
afford different samples of M-based inferences. Thus, biased judgment out-
comes did not appear as a consequence of overload, reduced motivation, or
motivated distortions, but as an adaptive way of dealing with actually observed
stimulus uncertainty.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Returning to the question asked at the outset, it is indeed possible that a
female student whose achievement in maths is low, who participates little, and
whose general performance level in other subject matters is also poor, will
benefit rather than suffer from teachers' judgment biases. The regressiveness
of inductive judgments is of advantage for poor rather than smart students,
and a low participation rate implies small samples and thereby keeps the
regression effect strong. So remaining mute might be a good strategy. For the
same reason, the stereotypical hypothesis that maths is a male domain may
not produce a negative bias against that girl, if the hypothesis induces positive
testing. Smaller samples about girls than boys in maths may serve to conceal
the girl's weakness, leading to less negative judgments of poor girls than
poor boys.
Thus, at least under certain boundary conditions, our experiments support
some uncommon predictions that set our environmental learning approach
apart from previous accounts of biased judgments referring to prior expectan-
cies as the major explanatory construct. Besides the basic accuracy of teacher
evaluations emphasized by some authors (e.g., Jussim, 1989, 1991), deviations
from the objective data in judgments are almost always interpreted in terms of
teachers' prior expectancies and (self-fulfilling) prophecies (Miller & Turnbull,
1986; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). Although different kinds of expectancies
can be distinguished, reflecting the overgeneralization of stable traits, group
stereotypes, or naõÈve behavioral theories, the common denominator is that
expectations are assumed to exist before the assessment of stimulus data.
Our intention was not to question the existence and the significance of even
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very strong effects of prior expectations. Hardly anybody would come to doubt
that prejudice, stereotypes, or wishful thinking can markedly distort judgments
and decisions (Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990; Kunda, 1990; Pyszczyn-
ski & Greenberg, 1987). Rather, the strategy of the present research was to
create conditions that highlight alternative sources of bias, arising as a normal
by-product of environmental learning. In the absence of any prior expectancies,
ordinary learning principlesÐconcerning sample size and differential regres-
sionÐcan create a variety of judgment biases that deserve the same theoretical
attention as the commonly noted reliance on expectancies. To highlight the
distinctive nature of our alternative approach, we have created conditions in
which unbiased environmental-learning processes override three of the most
prominent types of prior expectancy.
First, any tendency to overgeneralize global differences between smart and
poor students was overridden by the regressiveness of all inductive learning,
producing an opposite tendency to overestimate the achievement of poor stu-
dents and to underestimate the achievement of smart ones (Experiment 1). Any
self-fulfilling prophecy or perpetuating influence (Cooper, 1979; Rosenthal &
Jacobson, 1968) of classifying students into smart versus poor has to overcome
the inertia of the initial regression effect. The regressiveness of inductive judg-
ment affords a pervasive remedy against prior expectancy effects of the first
type, which consists in the use of global knowledge as a basis for judgments
under uncertainty, yielding a positive bias for smart students and a negative
bias for poor students. The rules of inductive learning counteract such a kind
of halo effect. It remains a matter of empirical research to figure out which
tendency is stronger under natural conditions. However, for theoretical reasons,
the impact of regression effects must not be simply ignored.
Systematic biasesÐdefined as deviations of subjective estimates from objec-
tive parametersÐarise nevertheless because regression is a function of sample
size. Technically speaking, the influence of large samples is to dampen a basic
regression effect, making actually existing differences between smart and poor
students more visible. Of two equally smart students, the one who was repre-
sented by a larger sample received regularly better ratings. Conversely, large
samples led to more negative evaluations of poor students. It does not matter
why teachers draw large versus small samples about individual students. Their
sampling may be a function of sitting position, students' names, their appear-
ance, teacher's sympathy, or students' motivation (frequency of raising hands).
For some of these reasons the judges might be blamed (e.g., sympathy for
particular students) but others are fully ªinnocent,º representing natural fluc-
tuations in the students' behavior. In any case, sample size affords a permanent
source of judgment bias, reflecting the richness of the learning environment
rather than biased cognitive processes.
In Experiment 2, the second type of prior expectancies, based on stereotypes,
was overriden by sample-size differences resulting from positive-test strategies
in hypothesis testing. Depending on the teacher's hypothesis-testing goal, sam-
pling focused particularly on gender groups (boys vs girls) in particular disci-
plines (language vs maths). When the hypothesis to be tested was congruent
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with common gender stereotypes, teachers would collect larger samples on
boys in maths and on girls in language. As a consequence, smart boys in maths
and smart girls in language appeared even smarter, but not poor boys and girls
in their respective gender domain. However, when testing counter-stereotypical
hypotheses, teachers would exhibit a similarly strong bias in the reverse direc-
tion. They would draw large samples about girls in maths and boys in language
and consequently judge smart girls in maths and smart boys in language even
smarter, but not poor girls and boys. In this manner, our environmental learning
approach led to a refined picture of the mechanisms by which stereotypes can
affect the inductive search and processing of information. At the same time,
our approach sheds new light on the interpretation of hypothesis confirmation
biases through positive testing (Crott, Giesel, & Hoffmann, 1998; Klayman &
Ha, 1987), independent of an expectancy bias.
Experiment 3 demonstrated that the third type of prior expectancies, re-
flecting naõÈve behavioral theories or scripts, also can be overridden by environ-
mental learning. When ability was held constant and students varied only in
motivation but teachers were nevertheless forced to judge ability, they tended to
infer ability from motivational cues. Just as in the case of objectively addressed
student responses, the teachers' subjective inferences from motivational cues
(raising hands) were subject to sample-size effects. Ability inferences from
motivational cues led to polarized judgments as sample size (i.e., opportunities
to make inferences) increased. However, the direction of the bias was not
determined by the common script that raising a hand is the first step in an
episode ending with a correct response. In a high-ability environment, when
raising hands was followed by a high base rate of correct answers, motivation
was used as a positive cue, giving higher ability judgments to highly motivated
students. In contrast, in a low-ability base rate environment, when raising
hands was typically paired with wrong responses, high motivation led to re-
duced ability judgments. Again, this demonstration highlights the power of
environmental base rates to moderate inferences based on scripted knowledge.
To understand the systematic biases in relative judgments of smart versus
poor students that result from ecological sampling effects, we need not postulate
any deficits of shortcomings in the teachers' cognitive processes. There is noth-
ing irrational in selecting larger samples from students who raise their hands
very often, in focusing on those events specified in a hypothesis (Oaksford &
Chater, 1994), or in utilizing an associative link to infer ability from motivation.
Drawing flat, fully equal samples from each and any target object in the environ-
ment would be detrimental to adaptive cognition and behavior. Being fed with,
and relying on, samples of differing size is inevitable, because environmental
objects always differ in salience, proximity, accessibility, and relevance to the
individual's problem-solving goals (Friedrich, 1993; Klayman & Ha, 1987).
Biases may result from such unequal stimulus samples not because judges
are misled by cognitive or motivational attractors or distracted by convenient
heuristics from systematic processing but, on the contrary, precisely because
they are so sensitive to the information inherent in the samples themselves.
Normatively appreciated information-processing devices such as a Bayesian
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computer algorithm, when fed with the same sample of unequal size, might
exhibit the same judgment biases (e.g., polarized judgments with increasing
sample size). By emphasizing accurate assessment and sensitivity to environ-
mental variation as origins of judgment biasÐas opposed to cognitive and
motivational distortionsÐthe sampling approach helps to reconcile the appar-
ent conflict between those theorists who point out the remarkable accuracy of
student evaluations and those concerned with systematic biases. The coexis-
tence of both positions was already conceded by other researchers (cf. Giger-
enzer & Goldstein, 2000; Jussim et al., 1994). The contribution of the present
research is to suggest a concrete set of cognitive±ecological processes by which
accurate stimulus processing can result in biased judgments.
If there is one deficit for which teachers themselves can be blamed, it is not
the construction and use of heterogeneous samples but their inability to monitor
and control the consequences of sampling effects (Koriat, 1993; Nelson, 1996).
Granting that the stimulus environment provides us with samples that differ
greatly in sizeÐas well as other pragmatic factors, such as source, conditional-
ity, and selectivity (Fiedler, 2000)Ðhuman intelligence might have evolved
devices for controlling and correcting the impact of sampling effects. There is
growing evidence to conclude that human judges often fail to understand sam-
pling constraints and the deductive rules needed to combine samples of different
origin (Evans & Dusoir, 1977; Kleiter et al. 1997; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer,
1997; Tiegen, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). They do not sufficiently
notice the effect of sample size or number of learning trials on their memory
(Koriat, 1997); they tend to treat conditional implications (if p, then q) as if
they were reversible (Evans, 1989; Wason, 1966); their sampling space is often
affected by logically irrelevant factors (Gavanski & Hui, 1992); they take sam-
ples for granted that exaggerate the base rate of rare but important events in
the population (Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch, & Wild, 2000); and they may
blindly trust in selectively obscured samples (Patrick & Iacono, 1991).
Why don't judges take the impact that sampling constraints have on their
judgments into account? Why have not appropriate metacognitive devices for
the correction of biases resulting from unequal or incomparable stimulus sam-
ples evolved? Although an informed answer to this intriguing question (see
Fiedler, 2000) is not yet available, an answer might be inherent in a seminal
article by Einhorn and Hogarth (1978). What our findings demonstrate is that
judges deal quite accurately with the observed data in front of them. What we
have called a meta-cognitive deficit might originate in an inability to take into
account unobserved data that might have been, but were not, sampled. Human
intelligence may not have evolved devices for taking such unavailable data
into account (cf. Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978).
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